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Assuming decreasing returns to education and the endogenous supply of qualified and non-
qualified labour it is shown to be efficient to supplement a consumption tax with positive 
incentives for education. If the return from education is isoelastic and if the choice is between 
(i) subsidizing the monetary cost of education and (ii) taxing nonqualified labour income 
more heavily than qualified labour income while keeping the effective cost of education 
constant, the latter policy is shown to be second-best efficient. In particular, any tax 
distortions should be constrained to labour choices while the choice of education should 
remain undistorted. The result holds for arbitrary utility functions. 
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1. Introduction 
Human capital accumulation is expected to be the driving engine of economic growth 
and development in the new century. Hence human capital policy should be highly 
ranked on the agenda. Unfortunately, the economic understanding of optimal human 
capital policy is still in its infancy. In particular, an integrated approach is still lacking 
which allows one to cope with the various sources of tax distortions and potential 
market failure. Economic analysis is rather eclectic in this field. The list of issues 
researched is long. It covers reasons of potential market failure such as positive 
external effects of education, incomplete markets for educational loans and missing 
private opportunities to insure against educational risks. It extends to issues raised by 
distortionary taxation and includes key words such as income uncertainty (Eaton and 
Rosen, 1980; Varian, 1980), informational asymmetry (Mirrlees, 1971), credibility of 
government policy (Andersson and Konrad, 2003), and asymmetric income taxation of 
human and physical capital (Heckman, 1976; Nerlove et al, 1993; Nielsen and 
Sörensen, 1997), to mention just a few prominent ones.  
One of the areas where systematic analysis has only begun refers to the imperfect 
taxation of rent income generated by the endogenous choice of education. The analysis 
has been triggered off by some numerical simulations carried through by Trostel 
(1993) on the basis of a representative agent general equilibrium model. This study 
finds a significant negative effect of proportional income taxation on human capital. 
By means of further simulation experiments Trostel (1996) shows that it is second-best 
efficient to supplement an income tax with a subsidy to higher education. In theoretic 
independent studies Wigger (2003 and 2004) and Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) look 
more closely at the question of when educational subsidies are efficiency enhancing. 
These studies differ from Trostel (1996) and the present one in the attempt to integrate 
two sources of imperfections in one single model: the imperfect taxation of rent 
income generated by education and the imperfect taxation of rent income generated by 
informational asymmetry in the Mirrlees tradition. Although similar in design the 
studies suggest strikingly different conclusions. Whereas Bovenberg and Jacobs 
(2005) find strong theoretical evidence for subsidising human capital investment,   3
Wigger (2004) proves that social welfare can never be increased by supplementing a 
non-linear income tax with a subsidy to higher education. The conclusions less raise 
the question of who is right or wrong but more of which modelling features are able to 
explain such contradicting results. This is where the present paper ties in. It offers a 
simple framework of analysis which allows one to give structure to a strand of 
literature which threatens to become more and more confusing. It does so by going one 
step back in the literature and by returning to the isolated analysis of the effects that 
the imperfect taxation of rent income of education has on efficient human capital 
policy. It is the author’s strong belief that these effects have not been well understood 
till now and that they are of key importance for the design of optimal human capital 
policy.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces a simple model of a 
representative household with the only endogenous choices concerning education and 
labour supply. Returns to education are decreasing and the source of rent income 
which cannot be fully skimmed off by a proportional tax on consumption. As a result, 
the Production Efficiency Theorem of Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) is not applicable. 
In Section 3 it is shown that it is efficiency enhancing to supplement the consumption 
tax with positive incentives for education. Two instruments are contrasted. One gives 
positive incentives directly by subsidising the monetary cost of education. The other 
gives incentives indirectly by taxing non-qualified labour income more heavily than 
qualified labour income while keeping the effective cost of education constant. In 
Section 4 the latter is shown to be the more efficient instrument. More precisely, it 
turns out to be second best to tax labour income regressively with respect to 
qualification. In particular, the choice of education should remain undistorted and any 
tax distortions should be restricted to labour choices. The result is surprisingly strong. 
It basically holds for arbitrary utility functions and only requires human capital to be 
an isoelastic function of education. Section 5 provides an example and Section 6 
reinterprets various related results of the literature in the light of the present analysis. 
Section 7 summarizes. Major proofs are relegated to an technical Appendix.  
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2. A representative household model 
Consider a representative household which has to choose between supplying non-
qualified and qualified labour,  l L  and  h L , respectively. The household derives utility 
) , , ( h l L L C U  from consumption C and the two differentiated forms of labour. Non-
qualified labour has to be divided between time spent in the market,  E Ll − , and time 
spent on education, E. It earns a constant wage rate  l ω  if supplied to the market. The 
productivity of qualified labour depends on the amount of education. The choice of E 
is part of the household’s optimization problem. Qualified labour is paid  ) (E H h ω  
where  h ω  is constant while the earnings function  H(E) displays positive but 
diminishing returns, H’>0>H”. It is well-known that the aggregate empirical earnings 
function tends to be log-linear with increasing returns in E. The focus of the present 
analysis is however on the individual choice of education and thus diminishing returns 
make more sense. 
The representative household is assumed to maximize utility in  E L L C h l , , ,  subject to 
the budget constraint 
  E L E H E L qC h h l l ϕ ω ω − + − = ) ( ) ( E L E H L l h h l l ) ( ) ( ϕ ω ω ω + − + = . 
Education has a cost in foregone earnings which is captured by  E l ω . Monetary costs 
of education like college fees come on top of these and are modelled by  E ϕ . The 
effective (unit) cost of education is given by  ϕ ω π + ≡ l . Finally, q is the consumer 
price of consumption. All prices are after tax and subsidy. In what follows, two 
policies will be compared in terms of efficiency. One is characterized by subsidizing 
the monetary cost of education, i.e. by targeting ϕ , while keeping wage rates constant. 
The other policy is characterized by taxing non-qualified labour, i.e. by targeting  l ω , 
while keeping π  constant. This policy is effectively realized by varying  l ω  and 
respecting  ϕ ω d d l − =  as a constraint. 
It must be stressed that the model assumes two separate time constraints, one for non-
qualified labour and one for qualified labour. It is as if lifetime would fall into two 
separate periods which are not made explicit. A true one-period model would suggest a   5
joint time constraint for leisure time, E,  l L , and  h L . The present model is flexible 
enough to cover this case if   l ω < ) (E H h ω   is assumed to hold in equilibrium. By 
arbitrage, the household maximizing  ) , ( h l L L C U +  will then choose to increase E only 
at the cost of  l L  and not at the cost of  h L .  
The analysis relies on the dual approach to optimal taxation. This means that the focus 
is shifted from the household’s (indirect) utility function to its (net) expenditure 
function. The task of minimizing (net) expenditures subject to an exogenous utility 
constraint is best solved in a two-step approach. At the first step rent income derived 
from education is maximized while keeping the level of qualified labour supply,  h L , 
fixed. Let rent income be denoted by  ) , , ( h h L Y π ω   ] ) ( [ max E L E H h h E π ω − ≡  and the 
optimal amount of education by  ) , , ( h h L E π ω . Note that the primary source of rent 
income is education and its diminishing return. Qualified labour supply increases rent 
income only indirectly via increased incentives for education. Assume that  h w  is 
labour cost and p the effective social cost of education. Clearly, 
) , , ( ) , , ( h h h h L p w E L E = π ω  holds if  h h w p/ / = ω π . In what follows  h h w p/ / = ω π  is 
interpreted as a condition guaranteeing an efficient choice of education relative to the 
given value of  h L . For the sake of brevity, speech will just be of efficiency in 
education whenever  h h w p/ / = ω π  holds. 
The expenditure function is defined as 
  ≡ ) ; , , , ( u q e h l ϕ ω ω    )] , , ( min[ h l h l l L Y L qC ϕ ω ω ω + − −   in  h l L L C , ,   such that 
u L L C U h l ≥ ) , , ( . 
Hotelling’s Lemma yields  C eq =  where  ) ; , , , ( u q C C h l ϕ ω ω =  solves the optimization 
and where the subscript q denotes a partial derivative. One equally derives the 









. Just like C, functions  l L  and  h L  are Hicksian 
ones to be evaluated at  ϕ ω ω , , , h l q  and u. Similarly, 
)) ; , , , ( , , ( u q L E E h l h l h ϕ ω ω ϕ ω ω + = .   6
Propositions 1 and 2 make use of two assumptions (A1) and (A2) ranking the 
elasticities of various demand and supply functions with respect to variations in q. In 







≡ ε  denote the 








≡ ε  the elasticity of non-qualified labour, 
both with respect to variations in q. The elasticities  q E ε ,  q Y ε  are defined accordingly. 
Assume first that consumption reacts more elastically than non-qualified labour, 
  q Ll ε  >  q C ε   .           ( A 1 )  
Assumption (A1) holds if the demand for consumption and for qualified leisure are not 
too complementary. (A1) fails to hold if non-qualified labour reacts strongly and 
negatively to an increase in q, i.e. if non-qualified leisure reacts strongly and positively 
to an increase in q. For constant utility the latter is conceivable only if both, 
consumption and qualified leisure, decrease in q. If the demand for consumption is 
complementary to non-qualified leisure, instead, then the LHS is positive while the 
RHS is negative and (A1) holds trivially. Assuming zero net expenditures, inequality 
(A1) is easily seen to be equivalent to the inequality 
  q C ε  >  q Y ε .           ( A 1 ’ )  
This equivalence is proved by differentiating the expenditure function 
Y L qC e l l − − = ω  with respect to q and by making use of  C eq = . The differentiation 
yields  
  hq L lq l q L Y L qC
h ⋅ + =ω   .         ( 1 )  
As before, subscripts indicate derivatives except for the case of labour supply 
functions. By some slight misuse of notation,  iq L  stands for  q Li ∂ ∂ /  with i=l, h. The 
equivalence between (A1) and (A1’) follows by some simple algebraic manipulation 
relying on (1) and e=0. 
The second assumption (A2) needed in the sequel requires that the rent income earned 
from education does not react more elastically than education itself,   7
  q Y ε  ≥  q E ε   .           ( A 2 )  
(A2) holds with equality in the important special case when human capital is an 
isoelastic function of education, 
η hE E H ≡ ) ( . Isoelasticity has further strong 




η hE E H = ) ( ,  1 < η , one obtains   q Y / ε  =  q E / ε   and   
x Y / ε  =  x E / ε +
ϕ ω + 1
x
  for   1 ,ω ϕ = x .       ( 2 )  
 
The proof is given in the Appendix. Inequalities (A1), (A1’), and (A2) will help to sign 
the efficiency effects of the tax reforms to be considered next. 
 
 
3. Marginal tax reforms 
The analysis assumes the availability of three tax instruments. The first one is a tax t 
on consumption. As it turns out it is convenient to define the rate in “inclusive” form. 
Treating consumption as numéraire good with a producer price of one, this means that 
t satisfies the condition q(1-t) = 1. In other words, the base of the consumption tax 
includes the tax payment. The second instrument is a tax  l τ  on non-qualified labour. It 
is convenient to define this tax in “exclusive” form. This requires  l l l w ω τ ) 1 ( + =  
where  l w  is the exogenous wage rate before tax. Qualified labour is assumed to remain 
untaxed,  h h w = ω . Hence a positive  l τ  can be interpreted as implying regressive 
taxation of labour income. The third and final instrument is a subsidy to education s. 
This is again defined in exclusive form requiring  ϕ ) 1 ( s f + =  where f is the monetary 


















. By invoking Hotelling’s Lemma, tax revenue 
can be written in the form of 
T =  ϕ ϕ ω e f e w e q l l l q ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( − + − + − .     (3) 
The social planner is assumed to maximize tax revenue T subject to the condition that 
private net expenditures remain constant at zero level, e=0. A set of instruments t,  l τ  
and s is said to be second-best efficient if it solves the planner’s maximization. Section 
4 studies the characteristics of a second-best efficient choice of instruments. Before 
turning to this exercise tax reforms are analysed that are both, partial and marginal. 
They are partial in the sense that the choice of instruments is constrained. One reform 
studied in some detail is characterized by varying s while keeping  l τ  constant. The 
other reform is characterized by varying  l τ  while keeping the effective subsidy to the 
cost of education constant. The effective subsidy σ  is defined by 
π σ) 1 ( 1 + = = + p f w . It remains constant if any variation in  l τ  is compensated by one 












=constant is respected as a constraint. The reforms 
are marginal in the sense that the consumption tax is marginally varied at some 
positive level t>0. The marginal variation is compensated in both cases by varying the 
second instrument at zero level. The compensation is such that the household’s net 
expenditures remain constant. The reform can be interpreted as one adding either  l τ  or 
σ  to a tax regime relying on the broad based consumption tax. The efficiency of the 
reform is measured by the resulting increase in government’s net tax revenue. 
 
3.1 Taxing non-qualified labour more heavily than qualified labour 
Consider a marginal change in t which is compensated in  l τ  and which leaves the 
choice of education undistorted, σ =0. It is easier to study the reform in terms of 
prices. Hence q is varied, compensation holds in terms of  l ω , and the cost of education 
is kept constant at the social level,  p l = = + π ϕ ω . The latter requires  l d d ω ϕ − = . 
Private net expenditures remain constant if  = = de 0   = + + ϕ ω ϕd e d e dq e l l q    9










− =  which equals 
l L
C
 and thus is positive. An 
increase in q has to be compensated by an increase in  l ω  if private net expenditures 
are to remain constant. The effect that such a tax reform has on tax revenue is 
measured by  
 
l l w dq
dT










































)] ( [ . 
The subscript  l l w = ω  indicates that  l ω  is marginally increased at level  l w . Note that 
l l w = ω  implies  f = ϕ  if π  is to equal p. Taking partial derivatives of (3) and 
evaluating the resulting expressions at  l l w = ω ,  f = ϕ  yields  
 
l l w dq
dT
= ω










− −  =  q e
q
q 1 −
[ q C ε  -  q Ll ε ] (4) 
which is negative given that conditions q>1 and (A1) are assumed to hold. 
 
Proposition 1: A reform by which a marginal decrease in the consumption tax is 
compensated by the introduction of a tax on non-qualified labour while 
keeping the effective cost of education constant enhances efficiency. 
 
The intuition for this result is obvious. Education generates rent income which accrues 
to the household only in part. The household fails to internalize the positive effect 
education has on the revenue of the consumption tax. Hence efficiency calls for more 
education at the margin. This objective can be achieved indirectly by leaving the 
education decision undistorted and setting incentives to substitute qualified for non-
qualified labour. As a result labour income is taxed regressively. 
 
3.2 Subsidizing the cost of education 
It is suggestive to encourage education more directly by subsidizing its cost. In order 
to study the effect of such a subsidy in pure form, assume that labour income is not   10
taxed,  l l w = ω . A subsidy to the effective cost of education then amounts to a subsidy 
to the monetary cost of education. In technical terms consider a marginal change in q 
which is compensated by a marginal change in ϕ  and evaluated at the level  f = ϕ . 






d q . The total variation of tax 












e q − −  =  q e
q
q 1 −
[ q C ε  -  q E ε ]  .    (5) 
Assuming (A1’) and (A2) the bracketed expression on the RHS is positive. As (A1’) is 
equivalent to (A1) one can conclude that the tax reform is marginally efficiency 
enhancing if q>1, (A1), and (A2) hold.  
 
Proposition 2: A reform by which a marginal increase in the consumption tax is 
compensated by introducing a marginal subsidy to the monetary cost of 
education is efficiency enhancing. 
 
The reform implies that the education decision will be distorted and that labour income 
will be effectively taxed proportionally through the consumption tax. The policy is 
intuitive and can be rationalized by the same kind of arguments used before when 
interpreting Proposition 1. Although Proposition 2 should not come as a surprise it is 
however not totally obvious. There are results in the literature which convey the 
intuition that it may well be efficient to tax factors more heavily when these factors 
produce pure profit and if pure profit cannot be taxed away. See e.g. Huizinga and 
Nielsen (1997). In the present context, this might have given support to the expectation 
that tax efficiency calls for taxing the cost of education (Richter, 2005). This is so as 
education generates non-taxable rent income and this effect conflicts with tax 
efficiency in a framework with distortionary taxation. Proposition 2 invalidates this 
kind of reasoning.   11
In the present framework a consumption tax is clearly equivalent to a tax on labour 
income which does not differentiate according to qualification,  τ τ τ ≡ = h l . If such a 
tax regime is taken for comparison, Proposition 2 implies that an effective subsidy to 
education, σ , which marginally exceeds τ  enhances efficiency. This result confirms 
simulations of Trostel (1996) and deserves to be looked at from a different perspective. 
Remember that the effective cost of education,  ) 1 /( σ π + = p , equals the sum of the 
opportunity cost of attending school,  ) 1 /( l l l w τ ω + = , and the monetary cost of 









  follows by noting 
ϕ ω τ ϕ ω ϕ ω π σπ ϕ ω σ s f w f w p l l l l l l l + = − + − = + − + = − = = + ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( . Hence 
l τ τ σ = >  implies  τ > s . The latter means that the monetary cost of education should 
be subsidized at a rate which exceeds the tax rate on labour income. One way of 
subsidizing the monetary cost of education is to grant deduction under the labour 
income tax. 
 
Corollary 1: If labour income is taxed at a rate which does not differentiate according 
to qualification, the monetary cost of education should be granted tax 
deduction at a rate which exceeds the tax rate on labour income. 
 
 
4. Characterizing efficient taxation 
There are obviously two possible ways of increasing tax efficiency. One is 
characterized by   0 , 0 = − = > π ϕ ω d d d l   and requires to tax non-qualified labour more 
heavily than qualified labour while keeping the effective cost of education constant. 
The competing one is characterized by   0 , 0 = = > l d d d ω ϕ π   and relies on 
subsidizing the monetary cost of education. The two feasible policies differ with 
respect to the following key features: 
•  Taxing non-qualified labour more heavily than qualified labour increases 
education indirectly whereas subsidizing education does so directly.   12
•  Taxing non-qualified labour more heavily than qualified labour and respecting 
p = π  as a constraint leaves the choice of education undistorted while the 
choice is distorted when the effective cost of education is subsidized. 
•  Taxing non-qualified labour more heavily than qualified labour generates tax 
revenue while subsidizing education relies on spending tax revenue. 
Given these features it is not self-evident which way of encouraging education is the 
more efficient one. One might conjecture that efficient policy should rely more on 
direct instruments and less on indirect ones. This would mean that the use of σ  or s, 
respectively, is more efficient than the use of  l τ . As a matter of fact, Proposition 4 
states just the opposite. As it turns out, encouraging education indirectly via the use of 
l τ  while keeping the effective cost of education constant is more efficient than doing 
so directly via the use of s. Obviously, directness provides no efficiency advantage in 
the present context. The third bullet provides a more convincing basis for 
understanding the relevant efficiency trade off. The parallel to the double dividend 
hypothesis (in weak form) known from environmental taxation is obvious (Goulder, 
1995; Bovenberg and de Mooij, 1994). According to this hypothesis it is more 
efficient to encourage socially desirable behaviour by taxing non-compliance instead 
of subsidizing compliance. By taxing non-compliance the distorting consumption tax t 
can be reduced while t has to be increased if compliance is subsidized. 
In order to prove that indirect encouragement of education is more efficient than direct 
encouragement, tax revenue T is jointly maximized in t,  l τ  and s, assuming that net 
household expenditures are kept constant at zero level, e=0. This is a standard 
Lagrangean optimization. After taking partial derivatives with respect to  ϕ ω , , l q  and 



















































































































ϕϕ ϕ ) (  .  (7)   13
This system is best restated in a form that admits to be interpreted in the spirit of 
Ramsey. For this purpose define the derivation operator ∆ to be applied to functions 
) ; , , ( u q X X l ϕ ω =  as follows: 
  ϕ ϕ ω X f X w X q X l l l q ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( − + − + − ≡ ∆ .     (8) 
Making use of the ∆-notation it is shown in the Appendix that the system of equations 


















.           ( 1 0 )  
This shows that efficiency is achieved if the policy induces equi-proportionate 
reductions in consumption C, education E and non-qualified labour  l L  when all these 
behavioural functions are interpreted in the Hicksian sense. 
 
Proposition 3: Efficiency in the taxation of human capital requires equi-proportionate 
reductions in consumption, education, and non-qualified labour. 
 
It is informative to restate (9) and (10) in still another form by making use of 
elasticities:  
  ) ( / / q E q Ll t ε ε −   =   ) ( / / l l l E L l ω ω ε ε τ −  +  ) ( / / ϕ ϕ ε ε E Ll s −     (9’) 
  ) ( / / q E q C t ε ε −   =   ) ( / / l l E C l ω ω ε ε τ −   +   ) ( / / ϕ ϕ ε ε E C s −     (10’) 
This form draws attention to the question of which values the policy instruments t,  l τ , 
s, or σ  respectively, should take on in the optimum.  
   14
Proposition 4: Assuming 
η hE E H = ) ( ,  1 < η , it is efficient not to distort the choice of 












, and to encourage education solely 
indirectly by taxing labour income according to qualification. 
 
The proof is given in the Appendix. It only relies on isoelasticity of the human capital 
function. No special assumptions have to be met with respect to the taxpayer’s utility 
function. If (A1) holds, the statement can be sharpened. Proposition 4 then takes the 
form that allows one to speak of a double dividend to be reaped by taxing non-
qualified labour income more heavily than qualified labour income. Given (A1) it is 
efficient to tax labour income regressively with respect to qualification and not only 
vaguely according to qualification. 
Consider the case in which tax revenue is not generated by a consumption tax but by a 
tax on labour income which differentiates rates according to qualification. Note that 









 implies  σ < s . 
 
Corollary 2: Assuming (A1) and 
η hE E H = ) ( ,  1 < η , it is efficient to tax labour 
income regressively with respect to qualification and not to grant full tax 
deductibility to the monetary cost of education. In other words, efficiency 
requires s< l h τ τ < . 
 
The intuition is that regressive taxation works like a subsidy for education. Hence the 
monetary cost of education should be subsidized less if the choice of education is not 
to be distorted. 
   15
5. An Example 
Assume quasi-linear utility,  ) ( ) ( h l L V L V C U − − ≡ , equally elastic disutility of labour, 
1 , ) ( 1 > ≡ − ν ν
ν
L L V , and isoelastic returns from education, 
η E E H = ) (,   η <1. It turns 
out that the problem is only well behaved in the sense that conditions of second order 
are fulfilled if ην < 1. The specific appeal of this example comes from vanishing 
income effects. Maximizing household’s utility yields the following conditions of first 





,  ) ( ' ) ( h




  and   π ω = h h L E H ) ( ' . Solving these equations 


























































a . This implies the following elasticities: 




















  for  ϕ ω , l x = . 
Plugging these values into (9’) and setting σ =0 yields 







The efficient tax rate on non-qualified labour increases in the consumption tax rate, in 
the elasticity of the disutility of labour and in the elasticity of the education function. 
 
 
6. Connections to the literature 
The analysis allows one to structure and to generalize various earlier results of the 
literature. A first group of results relates to the efficiency enhancing role of subsidies 
to education. Another earlier result refers to the optimality of the Nordic system of 
dual income taxation. Both topics deserve to be discussed in some detail. 
   16
6.1 To what extent are education subsidies efficiency enhancing? 
As mentioned before, the literature discusses the role of subsidies paid to education 
and the effect such subsidies have on the equity-efficiency trade off in the taxation of 
labour income. The conclusions derived are irritatingly opposing. According to 
Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) “redistribution and education subsidies are Siamese 
twins”. Subsidies on education are shown to alleviate the tax distortions on learning 
induced by redistributive policies. The more eager the distributive objectives are, the 
stronger must policy rely on educational subsidies. Quite to the contrary, Wigger 
(2003, 2004) proves that social welfare can never be increased by supplementing a 
non-linear income tax with a subsidy to the cost of education. The present paper helps 
to understand these seemingly conflicting conclusions. In order to do so the various 
frameworks of analysis first have to be described however. 
The papers of Bovenberg et al. and Wigger and the present analysis differ in one 
important respect. The former ones are written in the Mirrlees tradition. They connect 
the problem of taxing human capital accumulation efficiently with the problem of 
trading off equity and efficiency subject to informational constraints. The resulting 
analysis is much more complex than the present one which deals with pure efficiency 
issues. Still a comparison is possible and insightful. 
From the Mirrlees literature it is well-known that highly productive labour income 
should not be taxed at the margin if the tax planner wants to redistribute income 
between two productivity types of individuals and if low and high types cannot be 
identified on an individual basis. In present notation this means  0 = h τ . Relying on this 
famous result and on quasi-linear utility functions, Wigger is able to prove that a 
subsidy to the monetary cost of education effectively lowers social welfare, s< 0 = h τ . 
This comes close to Corollary 2 above. In fact, Corollary 2 is much stronger than 
Wigger’s result in the following sense. It assumes (A1) only and does not require 
utility functions to be quasi-linear. Furthermore it makes clear that s< h τ  follows from 
pure efficiency considerations while  0 = h τ  follows from the government’s need to 
respect an informational participation constraint when redistributing income from high 
to low productivity types of individuals.    17
Bovenberg and Jacob’s (2005) results are less easy to summarize. The reason is that 
these authors study education subsidies in varying frameworks. The most general one 
allows for costs of foregone leisure. With certain respect such as the feasibility of 
utility functions it is even more general than Wigger’s analysis. The price Bovenberg 
and Jacobs however pay is a loss in the simplicity and clarity of results. They are only 
able to prove that non-pecuniary educational costs may have an increasing effect on 
optimal education subsidies, especially if they are complementary to work effort. In 
the less ambitious part of their paper, Bovenberg and Jacobs ignore non-pecuniary 
educational costs. They demonstrate that optimal subsidies on education ensure 
efficiency in human capital accumulation even if the government values equity and 
pursues a redistributive policy. If tax rates on labour increase, optimal subsidies on 
education should do so as well in order to alleviate the tax distortions on learning. 
At first sight it may seem as if such a result goes beyond Proposition 4 of the present 
analysis. It seems to do so as the Bovenberg and Jacobs reuslt allows for a distributive 
objective which the present analysis does not. Closer inspection however reveals that 
the efficiency result of Bovenberg and Jacobs is not comparable with the one derived 
here. The key difference is that Bovenberg and Jacobs model education as an 
intermediate good so that the Production Efficiency Theorem of Diamond and 
Mirrlees (1971) applies. By way of contrast, education is no intermediate good in the 
present framework and hence Proposition 4 is unrelated to the Production Efficiency 
Theorem. Just note that education, as modelled here, is a leisure-time consuming 
activity generating rent income that cannot be fully taxed away. Hence important 
assumptions of the Production Efficiency Theorem are violated and still efficiency in 
education is obtained. The price that has to be paid is that Proposition 4 may not be 
expected to extend to a regime in which the government trades off efficiency against 
equity. 
In Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) the argument runs as follows. Because of distributive 
concerns it is efficient to rely on a distortional tax on labour income. As a poll tax 
allows to skim off pure ability rents, the Production Efficiency Theorem is applicable 
and this requires to leave educational investment undistorted. In the present analysis 
distortions arise by taxing consumption. A poll tax is not available but labour income   18
can be taxed according to qualification which is not the case in Bovenberg et al. 
(2005). Pure profit accrues to the representative household and yet it is efficient to 
leave the educational choice undistorted. 
One may well discuss whether tax rates should be allowed to depend on educational 
characteristics or not. From a positive point of view it is difficult to justify any 
dependence. No country is known to condition tax rates on educational characteristics 
explicitly. This common practice is however more and more questioned from a 
normative perspective. Most prominent is the idea to introduce graduate taxes. See e.g. 
Garcia-Penalos and Wälde (2000) or Poutvaara (2004). Such taxes are suggestive as 
school qualification and university degrees are certainly not difficult to verify by tax 
authorities. Even more, not to use this information is conceptually not really 
convincing given the framework of Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005). These authors 
assume that the government can subsidize individual monetary costs of education. 
Hence the government should be able to differentiate tax rates according to subsidies 
received. If not, the framework is not too far from the one assumed for Corollary 1 
above. It relies on the assumption, that labour income tax rates cannot be differentiated 
according to qualification for some non-specified exogenous reason,  τ τ τ ≡ = h l . 
Corollary 1 states that, given non-differentiability, the monetary cost of education 
should be granted tax deduction at a rate s that exceeds τ . This result confirms 
simulation results of Trostel (1996). It however contradicts Bovenberg and Jacobs 
(2005) who prove s=τ  in the less ambitious part of their paper. This is further 
evidence to the claim that the results of Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) and the ones 
presented here are only similar in spirit but different in substance. 
As has already been stressed, Proposition 4 is best interpreted with reference to the 
Double Dividend Hypothesis known from the literature on environmental taxation. If it 
is socially desirable to encourage education on the margin, one should do so by taxing 
non-compliant behaviour and not by subsidizing compliant behaviour. This is the so-
called weak form of the Double Dividend Hypothesis. See Goulder (1995). The first 
dividend is the positive effect on education and the second dividend comes from the 
generated revenue which can be used to cut back distorting taxes. There have been 
other less convincing attempts in the literature to relate double dividends to optimal   19
education policy. Jacobs (2005) suggests to speak of a double dividend if education 
subsidies produce more equality in before-tax incomes and also generate efficiency 
gains in taxation. He refers to Dur and Teulings (2004). These authors argue in favour 
of educational subsidies. By promoting education and relying on general-equilibrium 
effects, the distortionary cost of progressive taxation may be reduced. According to 
Jacobs (2005) a “double dividend” of education subsidies generating more equality in 
before-tax wages through general equilibrium effects and lower distorting tax rates is 
however not likely to occur. Corollary 2 of the present paper is another blow against 
the thesis of Dur et al. The monetary cost of education should not even be granted full 
tax deductibility if labour income can be taxed according to qualification. In other 
words, for pure reasons of efficiency education should be taxed and not subsidized on 
a net basis. The conjecture is that this result perfectly extends to a general-equilibrium 
framework. 
 
6.2 Dual income taxation 
The Nordic system of dual income taxation is a highly topical reform option in various 
countries.
1 The system combines progressive taxation of labour income with 
proportional taxation of capital income. Nielsen and Sörensen (1997) argue that the 
progressive part serves to reduce the private return to human capital investment, 
thereby offsetting the tendency of a proportional comprehensive income tax to 
discriminate in favour of such investments. This sounds very much as if Nielsen and 
Sörensen were searching for a policy discouraging human capital investment. In order 
to relate this irritating result to the present analysis the framework used by Nielsen and 
Sörensen has to be described in more detail. 
The framework is one in which a representative agent works and consumes in two 
periods. The productivity of second-period labour increases with the amount of 
education acquired in first period. Time spent on education reduces leisure and non-
qualified labour supplied to the market. The agent has two options to increase second-
period consumption. She can invest in human capital and she can save out of first-
                                                 
1 Only recently, the Council of Economic Advisors (2006) to the German Government has proposed to follow 
the Nordic countries and replace comprehensive income taxation by dual the taxation of capital and labour.   20
period non-qualified labour income. In this simple framework the capital income tax 
affects two margins. First, it discriminates against saving by reducing its return. By 
doing so the capital income tax indirectly reduces the return to non-qualified labour. It 
thus gives an incentive to substitute non-qualified by qualified labour. Secondly it 
increases the discount factor and thus gives incentive to increase the amount of 
education. If for some exogenous reasons qualified labour income were taxed more 
heavily than non-qualified labour income, then Proposition 2 would suggest to 
supplement the labour income tax with a tax on capital income. In fact, the capital 
income tax would only correct for the negative effect that the progressive labour tax 
exerts on educational investment. See Jacobs and Bovenberg (2005) and Richter 
(2006). The thing only is that Nielsen and Sörensen (1997) completely reverse the 
logic. As already mentioned, they argue in favour of a policy that discourages human 
capital investment and they additionally reverse the reform perspective. They keep the 
capital income tax exogenous and prove optimality of progressivity in labour income 
taxation. The present analysis only allows one to confirm their analysis with the 
following qualification. If the exogenous rate of the capital income tax is positive, it 
may well set excessive incentives for human capital investment. In this case 
progressive labour taxation may well be an efficient means to correct for the excessive 
incentives. Clearly, whether or not incentives are excessive should depend on the 
model’s parameterization. In fact, the efficiency condition (19) on which Nielsen and 
Sörensen base their policy recommendations is highly involved and extremely 
complicated. Without further research it is difficult to truly reconcile their own 




The policy conclusions derived from this paper’s analysis are just as unambiguous as 
unpopular. They are unambiguous in the sense that it could be shown under fairly 
broad assumptions to be efficient to encourage education when education generates 
rent income. The policy that proved to be second best is not to distort the education 
choice itself but to tax non-qualified labour more heavily than qualified labour and by   21
doing so to set incentives for substituting non-qualified labour by qualified labour. 
This form of indirect encouragement of human capital investment has been shown to 
be more efficient than the direct subsidization of the monetary costs of education. The 
intuition behind this result reminds one of the Double Dividend Hypothesis well 
known from environmental taxation. According to this hypothesis it is more efficient 
to tax non-compliant behaviour than to subsidize compliant behaviour. The results 
derived in this paper allow one to give a consolidated interpretation of various other 
results that have been produced in the literature and that tend to be contradictory and 
confusing. 
The policy conclusions derived from this paper’s analysis are certainly not very 
popular. Not many people would be willing to tax non-qualified labour more heavily 
than qualified labour. This paper should however be less considered an appeal to move 
towards regressive income taxation. The primary value of the analysis is to stress the 
social efficiency cost of progressive taxation. Progressive taxation with respect to 
qualification is just the opposite of what is needed to encourage human capital 
investment. This negative incentive effect magnifies the negative disincentives for 
labour choice highlighted by Mirrlees (1971) and others. 
A final remark concerns the simplicity of the model used in the present paper. The 
results derived are relatively strong and it is not clear how far they are owed to an 
overly simplistic model of human capital accumulation. There has been no explicit 
time structure and the accumulation of physical capital has not been modelled to 
mention just two obvious shortcomings. Part of these will be reconciled in the follow-
up paper by Richter (2006). Still, much further research is needed to see how far the 




The Remark is only proved for the cases in which the equality of elasticities is claimed 
to hold with respect to q. The cases of ϕ  and  l ω  are proved along the same lines. See 
also Richter (2006). The definition  ) , , ( h h L Y π ω E HLh h π ω − =  and the first-order   22
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holds if H is isoelastic. 
 
The proof of Proposition 3 makes use of  C eq = ,  ) ( E L e l l − − =  and  ϕ e =E. Equation 

































The proof of Proposition 4 requires some preparatory considerations. Note first that 
(1) holds in more general terms: 
  hx L lx l x L Y L qC
h ⋅ + =ω   for   ϕ , ,l q x = .       ( 1 1 )  
Making use of (8) and (11) one easily derives 
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h ∆ ⋅ + ∆ = ∆ ω   .         ( 1 2 )  
Assuming (6’) and isoelasticity of H, (7’) must be shown to hold if, and only if, 
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